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Abstrak 
Dengan menggunakan perspektiv perbandingan sejarah, dan mendasarkan pada kasus 
korupsi di sektor perhutanan, artikel ini berargumen bahwa meskipun Indonesia telah berubah dari 
negara berstruktur otoriter menjadi negara yang berstruktur demokratis namun sikap (attitude) para 
pelaku (actors) dalam negara masih belum berubah. Mereka masih berlaku feodal sebagaimana 
halnya pada saat negara ini masih berbentuk kerajaan ribuan tahun silam. Karakter feodal inilah yang 
kemudian memberi justifikasi bagi tetap langgengnya tradisi korupsi pada sepanjang sejarah bangsa. 
Lebih jauh, watak feodal dan korup ini sesungguhnya bisa dilacak akarnya pada nilai-nilai yang 
terdapat dalam budaya Jawa sebagaimana diuraikan oleh Bennedict Anderson.  
 
Kata kunci: sikap, pelaku, budaya jawa, korup 
 
A. PENDAHULUAN 
 Indonesia has been one of the most corrupt countries in the world. According 
to the report from Transparency International, Indonesian score of Corruption 
Perception Index is still very low as clearly described in the bellow:  
 
Table 1 
Indonesia Corruption’s Perception Index (CPI) 
 
Years  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
CPI 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.3 2,6 2,8 2,8 3,0 
Source: Transperancy International Indonesia 
 
 Those bad score are very surprising since nowadays Indonesia has entered 
more than a decade reformation era marked by the fall of the authoritarian 
centralistic regime under the New Order. This fact has made the arguments that 
based on the structural variables as a basic explanation of corruption no longer 
acceptable. While these arguments said that corruption was caused by a highly 
centralized -governmental structure (Smith, 1971), the data shows us that corruption 
was still happening during the first decade of decentralization era. Moreover, there is 
a tendency that the trend of corruption even becomes worst and widespread and 
resulted in the well know term of “korupsi berjamaah” (It is a term which means doing 
corruption collectively as if it is a kind of religious practice). 
 Given the background I would like to analyze why the corruption is still 
happening   although Indonesia has entered the new democratic and decentralized 
political system. Using the case studies of the practice of corruption in the forestry 
sector, I would like to argue that the basic cause of corruption lays on the attitude of 
the stakeholders in the political system which are corruptive and based merely on 
their own self interest. Furthermore, while the political system has changed from the 
centralized-authoritarian to the decentralized-democratic system, the attitude of the 
actors in the political system remains the same. Based on the cultural perspective, 
this corruptive attitude is justified by the Javanese culture which is then influencing 
the entire Indonesian’s political system. Finally, based on the historical perspective, 
this corruptive attitude can be traced back since Indonesia was still under the 
kingdoms political system and was shaped by the various kind of regime occupied 
Indonesia since the Dutch until the early Indonesia’s independence. 
 Before discussing the practice of corruption in the forestry sector in the New 
Order and Reformation era, I will make it clear first about what that I mean by 
corruption. The next section I devote to explore the influence of Javanese culture to 
Indonesian politics in which the culture of corruption is inherent in it.  I then provide a 
historical review on the practice of corruption in Indonesian politics since the 
kingdom era until the early Indonesian independence. Finally, I discuss about the 
practice of corruption in the forestry sector of two era’s.  
 
B. PEMBAHASAN 
B.1. What is corruption? 
 Before addressing the questions above, I would like make it clear about what I 
define as a corruption. Referring to Smith (1971:21) the term “corruption” refers to 
the use of public resource for private purposes. Consequently, this definition covers 
not only conventional monetary, but also political and administrative corruption as 
well. An administrator who exploits his position to extract unofficial payments from 
investors (either foreign or domestic) is using a public resource –his official position, 
prestige, status, and/or authority- for personal profit. Likewise, an official who 
appoints family and friends to lucrative government positions regardless of their 
abilities is using a public resource for private gain. 
 Furthermore, corruption can be categorized in various other ways based on 
the scale, the method and the target of this practice (Smith, 1971, 22). In scale, 
corruption can arrange from the high level corruption such as large manipulation and 
descending money at the top until the low level one such as a gift of cigarettes. This 
scale can happen both within a single government organization and across various 
levels of the governmental system –national, provincial, city, region and village. In 
term of method, there are some officials who directly divert funds which are under 
their control, while other use their official authority to command unofficial payments 
from private parties seeking special privileges or governmental assistance. While the 
former is stealing and constitutes represents the loss of a different kind of resources, 
the latter is bribery and represents the loss of different kind of resources, the 
government’s legitimacy, especially in the eyes of some critical elite groups such as 
professionals, academics, students, and civil servants. Finally, in term of targets, 
corruption can target on monetary, time, misuse of government authority or position 
and stealing equipment and other government’s material. 
 
B.2. Cultural Perspective on Practice of Corruption in Indonesia 
B.2.a. Corruption in Javanese Culture 
 To understand about why the practice of corruption in Javanese Culture is 
acceptable, it can be explained based on how power was seen in Javanese culture. 
Referring to Anderson (1972, 22-23) power is seen as concrete, homogenous, 
constant and doesn’t raise the question of legitimacy in Javanese culture. These 
concepts can be described as follows; 
 First of all, power is seen as concrete meaning that power exist independent 
of its possible users. It is not a theoretical postulate but an existential reality that is 
tangible, mysterious, and divine energy which animates the universe. Furthermore, 
power is manifested in every aspect of the natural world, in stones, trees, cloud, and 
fired but is expressed quintessentially in the central mystery of life, the process of 
generation and regeneration. 
 Second, power is homogenous meaning that all power is the same type and 
has the same source. Furthermore, power in the hands of one individual or one 
group is identical with power in the hands of any other individual or groups. 
 Third, power is constant meaning that the total amount of power within 
cosmos is remains fixed as the cosmos is neither expanding nor contracting.  Even 
though the distribution of power in the universe may vary, its total quantity does not 
change as power simply exist, and is not the product of organization, wealth, weapon 
and anything else. 
Finally, power does not raise the question of legitimacy. Meaning that power 
itself antecedes questions of good and evil since all power derive from a single 
homogenous source. Power is neither legitimate nor illegitimate. 
The idea that power doesn’t raise a question of legitimacy has the important 
implication to understand corruption. Since power doesn’t raise a question of 
legitimacy, there is no idea of the abuse of power in Javanese culture. In term of 
corruption, it is absolutely acceptable for the ruler (king) to accumulate wealth for his 
own self, although it should belong to the people. There is no separation between 
the public and the private. Moreover, the prosperity of the kings was seen as the 
prosperity of the society. This treatment is also worked for the ruler in the lower level. 
If we follow the tale of wayang, one of traditional show in Javanese culture who is 
using puppets as the tools, we will see that all of the rulers in the story, whether he 
acts as the protagonists or antagonists, are the chosen by the God. They are placed 
in the high level of stratification in the eye of the God. Since they act as protagonist 
or antagonist is merely to serve the God will. They just act like what that God has 
directed. 
Actually, the Javanese idea on power is only one aspect of Javanese world 
view on a good life (Suseno; 1997), since there are also so many other aspects as 
the part of Javanese world views. For the purpose of the thesis, I will only mention 
those that give legitimacy to the practice of corruption. One of the most important 
aspects is Javanese view in the harmony on cosmos. The Javanese believes that 
the nature of the universe is the order and harmony on cosmos; both in the macro 
and micro level.  
Therefore, they believe that to create a good life they have to keep the 
cosmos in harmony and order. Furthermore, since they believe that the super natural 
sphere has a correlation with natural events, they believe that the social order is the 
reflection of order in cosmos. In this sense, a key right place is something very 
important. In the view of a Javanese, his well being depends upon his findings on his 
place and staying. Upon reaching one’s place depends on the attainment of one’s 
goals, the fulfillment of wishes and the satisfaction of interests. Choosing the wrong 
place automatically means that the cosmic harmony is disturbed. Within their world 
view, Javanese have every interest that everyone should take up their assigned 
place.  
One of the positive signs of being at right place can be seen from the social. 
On the exterior social level, a condition of manifest harmony is the sign that 
everyone has found his place. Disorder or unrest in society implies a disturbance in 
cosmic harmony.  Inversely, every disturbance in cosmic harmony implies a threat to 
society. 
Furthermore, since they believe that social order and hierarchical were the reflection 
of order in cosmic, the Javanese always try to avoid conflict and maintain social 
order by means of respecting every one based on his place. In general, there are 
two stratification in Javanese, the priyayi (aristocrat; the ruling class) and  wong cilik 
(the ordinary people, the ruled). Furthermore, the hierarchy is also expressed 
through the language used by the Javanese. A Javanese will speak to the people in 
the lower or higher level with a different expression of language. The higher level or 
position to whom they are speaking, the more the language they use will express a 
respect and honor (Geertz,1989). Therefore, people in the low hierarchical level 
(wong cilik) will receive whatever treatment they get from the ruling class including 
the practice of corruption itself. They will appreciate it as it is. Questioning or 
protesting the treatment will result in the disharmony that they very much avoid. In 
another hand, since this hierarchical order was given by God, the people will always 
obey the rulers since they consider the ruler as chosen by God therefore the rulers 
will always do correct things for the whole society. Some scholars consider it as a 
patrimonilaism relation (Geertz;1989, Crouch;1979, Schwarz;1994). This term refers 
to a relation between ruler and ruled as if a relation between father and son. Society 
is viewed as if it is a family with ruler as a father and people as a son. This term is a 
representation of two kinds of relations that traverse this nodal point: (1) that 
between fathers and sons as dominant and subordinate masculinities ordered 
around images of  fatherhood and filiality, and (2) that of the political relation among 
father-rulers, conducted on the basis of their socially-recognized paternal status. 
 
Finally, one of the most important ideas that legitimate the practice of 
corruption in Javanese culture lays on how the Javanese views on the family. Family 
has central point for a Javanese. They will live their life by using the family as the 
reference to see the world. A Javanese will act or behave in such manner that is 
acceptable for his family. A Javanese obtains his individuality from the family he lives 
in. 
Since a very little child, a Javanese will be educated to be somebody who 
brings such a good thing to his family. A father, for instance, will teach his son that if 
the son getting adult he will be orang (a man).Meaning that the son will be somebody 
who can give a good name to the family. Furthermore, the father is also educated 
the son not to forget his family when he is already orang (a man). 
In term of practice of corruption, it implies that if a Javanese becomes a ruler 
or whatever position in which he holds a position in the political system, he will not 
forget his family and giving a priority to his family. If he had a project to do, he will 
give it to the people who have the closest relationship with him in term of family. If he 
has an authority to decide for the recruitment of official’s position, he will also give a 
priority to his family. Since, for a Javanese, giving a priority to the family is a kind of 
moral obligation. Family is the first place he obtains his position in the social order. It 
reflects the order in cosmic as given by the God. Therefore, respecting the family by 
giving a priority to the family will mean respect to the whole cosmic to create a 
harmony.  
 
B.2.b. Java and Its Influence to Indonesian Politics 
 Java is the most heavily populated island in Indonesia, with 60 per cent of the 
population occupying only 7 per cent of the total land area. As the centre of colonial 
activity, by 1930 Java already had experienced a long period of agricultural 
intensification, construction of irrigation facilities, and development of the 
infrastructure for colonial economic activities, making it the dominant region in 
Indonesia. 
The Javanese are the largest of Indonesia's 36 major ethnic groups. Their 
homelands are in the central and eastern parts of the island. The second largest 
ethnic and linguistic group, the Sundanese, occupy the western part of Java. 
Because the post-Independence Indonesian government has not allowed the 
inclusion of an ethnicity question in the census, the total population by ethnic groups 
is not available. Hugo et al. (1987) estimated Javanese dominance in Indonesia by 
using the language spoken in the homes in the 1980 census data, which showed 
that 40 per cent of the Indonesians speak Javanese at home, and 58 per cent living 
in Java speak this language. 
Population growth, leading to conversion of agricultural land to residences, 
reduced both the total area of land under cultivation on Java and the size of the 
average farm. At the same time, overinvestment in manufacturing drew people to 
seek non-agricultural, urban jobs. According to the World Bank (1988), the urban 
population is growing five times as fast as the rural population. 
 After the Indonesian independence, Java has been the central of Indonesian 
politics. Not only because of it is the island where the Capital City is located but it is 
also because of there are so many political elite from this island. Five of six 
Indonesian President ever is Javanese except Habibie which is the third president. 
During the Old Order, there were so many political leaders are sent from Java to the 
outer island by the central government.  
The high role of Javanese became more crucial during the New Order. The 
central government appointed the local leader in the province, city and regency all 
over Indonesia from Javanese. Soeharto, the Presiedent of the New Order, used his 
power as the leader of the dominant party; Golkar, and as the highest general in 
army to appoint the leader. Golkar was directly linked to military, and control the 
national, provincial and district level assemblies. Although there were two main 
opposition parties –Partai Persatuan Pembangunan and the Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia- these are strictly controlled and never won the election.  In 1987, twenty 
one of Indonesia’s twenty-seven governors were Javanese and are either active or 
“retired” generals or colonels. Many of the cabinet ministers have army backgrounds 
and are Javanese.  
 
B.3. Historical Review on Practice of Corruption in Indonesia 
 Based on historical comparative perspective, the practice of corruption has 
colored Indonesian’s politics throughout history, which is to say that while the 
political system is changed, the culture of corruption remains the same across the 
Indonesian history.  
 
B.3.a. The Kingdoms-Feudalistic Era 
Begin from hundred years ago, a period when Java was still split into some of 
feudalistic- kingdoms. There was a Mataram Kingdom, located near present-day of 
Yogyakarta, Airlangga Kingdom (1019) in East Java and Majapahit kingdoms (1350-
1389). In this time period, the people were effectively ruled by aristocrats who, as the 
representatives of the kings, enjoyed patrimonial privileges not unlike those in feudal 
Europe. Here no distinction was made between the public and private affair. The 
king itself has a right to accumulate the prosperity (such as: money, gold, etc) as well 
as has many selirs.  It is a name given to woman who becomes a servant for the 
king to function just like a wife, including sexual activities. 
Furthermore, the king has a right to appoint his family to hold an important 
position in the kingdom. 
 
B.3.b. The Colonial Era 
The practice of corruption was also shaped during the colonial era. Prior to 
Dutch East India company offered Indonesians flagnant examples of corrupt 
behavior. In the words of Clive Day, the men of the Company were underpaid and 
exposed to every temptation that was offered by the combination of a weak native 
organization, extraordinary opportunities in trade, and an almost complete absence 
of check from home or in java. Officials become rich by stealing from the company. 
Some forms of theft came in time to deserve a less harsh name, as they were so 
cuurent and open that they could be regarded as legal. 
In the writing of Raffles and the numerous colonial reports cited by Day, it is 
clear that the demise of company rule and the arrival of the Dutch governor general 
at the turn of the nineteenth century resulted in an unavoidable widening illicit 
practices (Smith, 1970;23). As colonial regulation and control expanded, both 
European and native officials indulged in obvious abuses, enjoying not only the 
specified percentage which was their right, but also a portion of most resources 
passing through their hands. When traditional; services and payments due the native 
aristocratic officials had no alternative but to use illegal means if they wished to 
maintain the state of life to which they were accustomed. Other aristocratic Javanese 
bribed their way into renumerative positions dispensed by Dutch Officials. And  with 
the  expansion of Dutch taxation on the land and its produce, native officials as low 
as village headmen and their assistants took adavantage of new opportunities for 
profiteering. In java, some bekel (tax farmers) raised twenty-fold what they paid to 
their superiors. Their devices for extortion were innumerable.  
 
B.3.c. The Guided Democracy era 
With the rise of nationalism and the achievement of an Indonesian state, 
claims to state resource became public claims and the private use of what were now 
“public” funds became “corruption.” Thus, the expansion of corruption in Indonesia, 
as in other new states, constitutes, in part, a new definition of corrupt practice rather 
than a change in traditional behavior. Smith quoted Wetheim that said that, “…..a 
kind of public conduct hitherto considered normal was now looked at with other, 
more critical eyes.” 
Like what has been written by Smith (1993 : 25), the practice of corruption 
also occurred during the guided democracy period (1958-1965). This stems from 
revolutionary leaders’ perceptions of the function of the state. In nearly all cases, the 
government role in society –political, economic, and administrative – expanded very 
considerably. With this expansion came many new possibilities for corruption and 
bribery involving public official. 
In the writing of Soe Hok Gie, one of the young main actor for the student 
movement to impeach Soekarno from his presidency, the practice of corruption done 
by Soekarno was one of the main reasons the student’s demonstration to impeach 
him took a place. Soekarno was seen as corruptive in his attitude by having so many 
wives around him and accumulating wealth in his palace. The practice of corruption 
was also seen from his intention to be a president a life time.  
 
B.4. The Practice of Corruption in the forestry sector: New order and 
Reformation Era 
In this part, I will present how the corruptive attitude of the political actors in 
the two regime has become the underlying factors that leads to one of the biggest 
problem in forestry sector which is deforestation.  
As what that has been reported from several resources, is facing a serious 
problem of deforestation. The report from the Indonesian’s Environment Forum 
(WALHI), for instance, shown that in the year 1997, Indonesia has lost 72% of its 
genuine forest. Furthermore, the speed of deforestation in the period 1985-1997 is 
1.6 million acres a year. While in the period 1997-2000 the increasing number of the 
deforestation is 3.8 million squares a year. The official report from the Bureau of 
Planology of Forestation Department shows that in year 2000, there was 59,62 
million squares of forest that was broken. The latest data reported by World 
Resource Institute published in 2002 shown that Indonesia is losing nearly 2 million 
ha of forest every year. 
 The data shows us that the deforestation is still happening and has not been 
solved although Indonesian’s has moved from the centralistic and authoritarian era 
under The New Order (1967-1997) to the reformation era which is marked by 
democratization and decentralization. 
Before going further, I want to make it clear first about what that I mean with 
the deforestation itself.  Referring to Sunderlin and Reksosudarmo (in Rosyadi, 
2003, 41), there are five references to deforestation. First, it refers to just permanent, 
or both permanent and temporary removal of forest cover. Secondly, it refers the 
loss of forest cover all kinds of uses, or it refers to the loss of forest cover that will 
never again regenerate for timber production. Thirdly, it refers to the removal of 
forest alone or it refers as well to the loss of various kinds of forest attributes, such 
as density, structure and species composition. Fourth, instead of defining the term 
deforestation, some studies also refers to the one who removes the forest covers or 
that prevents the re-growth of the forest cover. Five, a view that points out that the 
agent of deforestation is most appropriately defined in terms of the ultimate 
designated use of cleared forest land instead of the action and intensions of those 
who actually clear the forest.  
In this paper, for the purpose of this thesis, deforestation is defined as a 
process where the state forest trees are illegally felled by human activities. The term 
“illegal” refers to unintended forest feeling that is ethically bad because it leads to 
negative externalities such as landslide, flood and species extinction. 
B.4.a. During Centralized-Authoritarian New Order 
The corruptive attitude of the political actors in The New Order has become 
the underlying factors that leads to one of the biggest problem in forestry sector 
which is deforestation (Dauvergene, 1993; Santoso 1999; Barber; 2002; Rosyadi, 
2003).  
Dauvergne (1993) argued that much of the explanation on deforestation 
failed to comprehend the problem since it isolates different agents and underlying 
factors which contributes to deforestation and do not provide a broader context in 
which to understand the process which leads to deforestation. Furthermore, he 
argues that the process that leads to deforestation in Indonesia cannot be fully 
understood without examining how Indonesian politics and the attitudes of the 
decision makers, with support from the international system, shape and drive the 
various factors which contribute to deforestation. By focusing on these political 
forces, he argued that the vested interests which benefit from and which encourage 
and support activities has led to the deforestation itself. He stated that there were the 
working together between the president, the military and the private enterpreuners to 
join in the illegal logging. This working together was possible as the decision making 
made by the president was based merely on the informal relationship such as age 
and seniroirty, family ties, education, ethnicity and religion. This kind of attitude also 
shaped the structure of the new order political system. 
In parallel, Rosyadi and Sastranegara (2003 : 107) argued that the ongoing 
problems of deforestation was rooted in the centralized forestry institutions 
established by the “New Order” Regime (1967-1997) to serve the interests of elite 
around the government. These elites consist of the politician, the military, the 
bureaucracy and the private enterprise. These groups had established a strong 
network, the so-called triangle of “corruption, collusion and cronyism”. 
During the New Order, in the name of development, the government pursued 
to push economic growth by whatever policy was necessary to be taken including 
exploitation of natural resources. In this time, the exploitation of forest was not an 
exception as revenues from forests were an important source of foreign exchange 
for the public budget as well as for the military and the political elite. Hundred of 
concession rights to forests exploitation were issued at the end of 1960s to military 
organizations, private enterprises, and bureaucrats close to the power and the 
government center. 
 Finally, they come to the conclusion that deforestation in Indonesia is an 
indication of an institutional crisis. Forest concessions that were given by the 
governments to its cronies had been misused to overexploit forest resources and led 
to deforestation. Such policies are closely related to the dominant role of the 
government that is assigned to control natural resource use by the formal laws. 
Unfortunately, the formulation process of various formal laws frequently bestows the 
central government a strong role in forest management but undermine customary 
laws and the livelihood of local communities. Structural adjustment program 
recommended by international donors also contributed to the deforestation process. 
Therefore, they suggest that demand for forestry reform should focus on institutional 
changes towards devolution in order to achieve sustainable forest management and 
to improve the people’s welfare.       
 Talking in the same sense, on his analysis of the deforestation during the New 
Order, Santoso (1999) argued that the deforestation was caused by the incapability 
of the forestry regime, which was the state bureaucracy, to implement the rules it 
made. This failure was caused by the fact that it was undermined by particularistic 
interests. 
Furthermore, he argued that the lucrativeness  of forest exploitation 
businesses invited political penetration from the core of the state into the 
bureaucratic control of the ministry of forestry. In this case bureaucratic control was 
subject to political control that pursued rent seeking activities. So, on the one hand 
there was the institutionalization of extra-bureaucratic interests –represented by the 
channeling of the accumulation of funds from forestry exploitation to underfunded 
military organizations, whilst on the other, there was the constraints placed on the 
institutionalization of the forestry bureau-technocracy due to the incursion of the big 
business community. Apparently, the ministry of Forestry became the prisoner of its 
own fortunes. 
The business community managed to establish an informal sphere of forestry 
governance within which rent seeking became normality, and which allow privately 
owned capital to be channeled to top-up the state’s non budgeted activities. This 
explained in part, why under-funded ministry of defend and security was able to 
sustain its key role in controlling Indonesian political life for so long, namely since the 
establishment of the new order.  The core of the problem was not a shortage of fund 
as such, but rather the attitude toward the use of readily available funds. The 
technocratic idea of establishing a retention fund was subverted by the hunger for 
economic rents from forest exploitation.  
 Barber, et al, (2002:) argues that the roots of deforestation is in a corrupt 
political and economic system that regarded the natural resources, especially forest, 
as a source of revenue to be exploited for political end and personal gain. They 
argued that the country’s growing wood processing and plantation crop industries 
proved lucrative over the years, and their profitability was used by the New Order 
regime as a means to rewards and control friends, families and potential allies. 
During more than 30 years of its ruling, the country vastly increased its out put 
During the new order, the Indonesian political system used the centralistic 
pattern. Almost all of the decision making was made by the central government 
through a top down model. In this part, I will present that the attitude of the political 
elite in the central government that is corruptive and act based on individual interest 
has run the real day to day politics in Indonesia. It shaped how the process of 
government was done. Therefore, the formal government structure at the time 
explain only small part of how politics accurately works. 
The formal government structure in Indonesia based on the 1945 constitution 
and subsequent legislation. The central government is located in Jakarta and there 
are three levels of local government; provincial, district and village. The national 
parliament is composed of two bodies : the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
and the legislative House of Representatives (DPR). In theory, the thousand-
member MPR is the highest authority of the central government and elects the 
president and vice-president for five year terms. However, the MPR rarely  mets and 
more than half members are appointed by the government. The DPR is composed 
four hundred elected members and one hundred members appointed from the 
armed forces. Most analyst consider it a politically weak body, since neither the 
president nor the ministers are members, while in practice legislation is initiated at 
the executive level. The president has direct power to the armed forces, he 
appointed ministers and governors, and proclaims laws. The bureaucracy provides 
technical advice to the ministers and they in turn advise the president. The courts 
deal with civil and criminal law do not rule on constitutional matters. 
However, this formal structure explains only a small part of how politics 
actually works. The military, in fact, controls most aspects of the political structure, 
including the central government in Jakarta, the provincial governments in the outer 
islands, the bureaucracy and many of the state run companies. President Soeharto, 
a retired general from central Java, emerged as the most powerful political figure and 
establish his New Order government after the military deposed Soekarno in the mid-
1960s. The bureaucracy is strongly influenced by the military, althoufht it does have 
some   independence based on its exepertise. Around 60 percent of the senior 
officials in the central government ministries were directly connected with the military 
in the late 1980s, and all civil servants must join Golkar.  
During Soeharto’s rule, political decision making has gradually become more 
centralized in Jakarta, in the hands of the Javanese. Approximately 75 percent of the 
decisions making positions in the Indonesian military are now controlled by the 
Javanese. Centre of power outside of the government have been eliminated or 
appeased, and control over the central over the central government apparatus has 
been tightened. Although the majority of Indonesia’s exporting oil, wood, tin, 
plantation corps come from the outer islands, the central government controls the 
profits. Many provinces in the early 1980s still depended on central grants for up to 
90 percent of their revenues. The decision making is seen as the pure view of the 
central government, revenues flow into the central government for only partial 
disbursement to the regions, and the perceptions of the central governments are 
translated into national program made applicable to all areas of the country. 
Certain important cultural aspects shape how government decision making is 
made. Age and seniority are important determinants of the extent input decisions. 
Coupled with this is a general belief in consensus decision making, with open 
opposition to policies being socially incorrect. Consequently, decision making tend to 
be conservative, reflecting the status quo. Another important aspect of everyday 
decision making is the important of connections, including those based on family 
ties, education, ethnicity and religion. These informal relationships involve reciprocal 
favors. 
Meanwhile, the was also a split in the army hierarchy between military 
managers, those in charge of trading enterprise and occupying high administrative 
post, and field officers with who provide security. Military managers must supply field 
officers with money, often obtained by corrupts means. A further element played 
important role here is the use of patronage to appease hostile, and potentially 
hostile, groups by distributing prestigious positions and material benefits to selected 
individuals. 
 
B.4.b. During Decentralized-Democratic Government in The Reformation Era 
In the reformation era which marked by the fall of the New Order regime after 
the retire of Soeharto from his presidency, Indonesia entered the new political 
system which by transforming it from the centralized-authoritarian regime into 
decentralized-democratic regime. Despite of this change, in term of deforestation, 
the roots of causes of the deforestation remain the same. McCarthy (2002; 868) 
argued that the roots of illegal logging can be found in the shifting economic and 
political interests of diverse actors at the district, sub district, and village levels. As 
these actors enter into exchanges and accommodations around logging, they create 
the de facto institutional arrangements governing timber operations.  
Therefore, the different is that while in the new order, it is mainly the central 
government who enjoy the corruption, during the new era, the practice of corruption 
was primarily enjoyed by the local stakeholders which are local politician, local 
officials, private entrepreneur, village leaders and villagers (McCarthy, 2002, 879). 
Each of them takes a part to make the deforestation happen based on their interest. 
Officials exploiting their positions could generate significant rents, both for their own 
personal use and for political purposes. Key local politicians could increase their 
popular support by expanding district budgets to provide for projects and programs 
that offered opportunities to client and followers. At the same time, entrepreneurs 
and their agent could maintain timber operations by entering into exchanges that 
involved extralegal gifts and favors with certain local politicians and State 
functionaries. As these external networks entered the village arena, the pattern of 
the exchange needed to also accommodate customary (adat) assumptions and 
authority structures. In the face of external interventions backed by powerful district 
figures, rather than merely watching the depletion of local forests from the sidelines, 
community leaders choose to promise: loggers could cut in community forest territory 
by collecting funds for community purposes, at the same time extracting rent for their 
own benefit. In the face of severe fluctuation in the price of agricultural commodities, 
villagers were also attracted by short-term livelihoods that could be gained from the 
unsustainable mining of local forests. In this way, village actors enjoyed a portion of 
the flow of benefits gain from logging community territory.  
Comparing the practice of illegal logging –one of the main cause of 
deforestation by human- in Kalimantan, Indonesia, Obidzinski (2002:2134)  argued 
that while well entrenched networks of patronage and corruption remain, the 
decentralization process has blurred the distinction between “legal” and “illegal” 
logging by giving rise to locally sanctioned timber extraction. In other words, local 
government may officially legitimate timber extraction by issuing timber permits, 
however they do so without any due regard for sustainable development. 
Furthermore, the practice of illegal logging has been legalized by the regulation.       
 
C. PENUTUP 
 Indonesia has been one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Based on 
the cultural perspective, this practice has been justified by the value inherent in 
Javanese culture, especially in the idea that power is neutral and doesn’t raise any 
question of legitimacy, meaning that there is no idea of abuse of power in Javanese. 
This idea gives legitimacy to whatever practice done by the king or those who hold 
the power. Actually, this idea is part of the Javanese view about the world and about 
a good life. Furthermore, there are also any other idea which gives a legitimacy to 
the practice of corruption such as; a moral obligation to obey the family (an idea 
which implies to the practice of nepotism), the idea that hierarchical order in society 
is given by God in which a Javanese must obey in order to protect social harmony, 
therefore the ruled class (wong cilik) may not questioning or protesting whatever 
practice done by the ruler including corruption. This kind of relation between the ruler 
and the ruled in is then well known as patrimonialism. 
 Meanwhile, these values in Javanese culture are then influencing the entire 
Indonesian politics since Java is the centre of Indonesian politics since the colonial 
era until the period when Indonesia declared its independence. Beside a centre of 
Indonesian politics, the Javanese are the main actors in the Indonesian politic since 
the Old Order of Soekarno until the New Order of Soeharto. Especially during the 32 
years of New Oder, Soeharto used a kind of policy which made the influence of 
Javanese in Indonesia politics much stronger by appointed the leader for the many 
of the whole province, city and regency in Indonesia from a Javanese. In another 
hand, Java has been the most with multiethnic and populated island in Indonesia 
which is more than fifty percent Indonesian population lives in this island.  
Based on comparative historical perspective, the practice of corruption has 
been occurred since Indonesia was still in the form of feudalistic kingdom. Since the 
time, the value that legitimizes the practice of corruption has been inherent within it. 
As the consequence, the king was considered as has a right to accumulate around 
himself such wealth and prosperity as well as appointed his family to be the part of 
the rulers. The practice was shaped by the Dutch during the colonial era in which the 
Dutch in working together with the local (pribumi) aristocrat s were doing such 
practice of corruption. Furthermore, the practice of corruption was also occurred 
massively during the Old Order of Soekarno. 
 Based on the case study on forestry sector which is the deforestation caused 
by the illegal logging is the problem, we can see that the practice of corruption is 
remains the same. The change in the political system from the authoritarian-
centralized regime during the New Order to the Decentralized-Democratic doesn’t 
government doesn’t does not mean the practice of corruption to be minimized.  
In summary, while the state and form of Indonesian political system has 
changed over time, the society remains the same. It is a society who holds such 
culture that legitimizes the practice of corruption within its selves. It is, then, what I 
call as the new state with the old society. 
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